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Wood: We welcome Professor Pannenberg to our noon luncheon and panel 
discussion. We also welcome our panelists, and this overflow crowd of stu-
dents and faculty. I believe you will find this discussion to be intellectually 
and spiritually rewarding. 
Our procedure will be to allow each panelist to address a question to 
Professor Pannenberg, and he will respond to each question in the order in 
which it is given. 
During his presentation of the annual Theta Phi lectures at Asbury Theological 
Seminary, Woljhart Pannenberg responded to these questions posed lly a 
distinguished panel. Dr. Pannenberg is professor of systematic theology at the 
University of Munich. 
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Stone: I have two questions regarding Professor Pannenberg' s development 
of the doctrine of the Trinity. These questions derive specifically from the 
suggestion that we should not regard the unity of God as a person or a sub-
ject but rather in terms of Spirit, understood under the metaphor of a field of 
power. First of all, in the Old Testament Yahweh is clearly presented as one, 
a unity, and yet clearly as a personal subject, an agent. How do you under-
stand the Old Testament presentation of Yahweh's personal agency in the 
light of your suggestions about the unity of God? And, second, the Old Tes-
tament presents Yahweh as a sovereign person over against the widespread 
belief in ancient religions in an impersonal field of power beyond the gods 
from which the world and the gods emerge. How would you respond to the 
fear that your metaphor of a field of power, of spirit, is possibly a revival of 
an ancient pagan concept which the Bible is opposed to? 
Pannenberg: Well thank you for your provocative question. I'm sorry that I 
didn't present my lecture on the Trinity before you had a chance to ask that 
question. 
The answer to your first question is that the Yahweh of the Old Testa-
ment is, of course, the Father of whom Jesus Christ spoke in His message. 
Thus, the first person of the Trinity is identical with the God of the New 
Testament although the way of addressing the God of the New Testament in 
the language of Abba is a little different from the Old Testament usage of 
addressing God. Although God is sometimes referred to as Father-be it of 
the king, be it of the people of Israel-still the nuances of Jesus talking about 
the God of the Old Testament, the God of Jewish faith, in terms of Father are 
different from what is the general basis of the Jewish tradition in talking 
about God. It is the same God. And it's really important that the Father 
whom Jesus Christ talked about and addressed as God is the God of the Old 
Testament. But we also think that only in the way Jesus talked about God is 
the God of the Old Testament revealed in His true reality. So, in some way, 
we do not yet find the ultimate character of the God of Jewish faith in the 
Old Testament. I think this must be the test of faith. Otherwise Jesus would 
be just one in the number of prophets of Israel among others. It is this es-
chatological claim to ultimacy which also means that the way that the one 
God was experienced and addressed before was not yet coming to us in ulti-
mate form of understanding of whom the people of the old covenant were 
talking about. Thus, the Father of Jesus Christ is identical with Yahweh. 
But now the difference, and I will come back to this in my lecture: the 
way the God of the Old Testament is revealed as Father by Jesus Christ is 
inseparable from this form of manifestation so that this form of manifesta-
tion belongs to the Eternal Being of the God of the Old Testament as He is 
addressed as Father by Jesus. And thus what I think has not been achieved 
in the tradition of Jewish interpretation based on the Old Testament preced-
ing Jesus Christ, and maybe after the history of Jesus Christ, is to express the 
identity of the transcendent reality of God, the God of Israel, with His mani-
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festation-with the ultimate form of this manifestation. That is what the 
doctrine of the Trinity does. 
Then the question arises as to what is the unifying issue that binds to-
gether the Father, the Son, and the Spirit in the concreteness of the divine 
reality in its manifestation which is not different from the eternal being of 
God. And then one can say, "Well, God is love. God is Spirit." Both answers 
come from the Johannine writings. Perhaps one can also say God is His 
Kingdom. The Kingdom of God and God Himself are not to be separated 
and I will say tomorrow something about how Father, Son and Spirit are 
united in relation to the issue of the Kingdom of God. When we speak of 
God as spirit, of course, then the question comes up as to what is meant by 
the term spirit. And I would call upon your competence as an Old Testa-
ment scholar when I say that spirit is not mind in the Old Testament. Ruach is 
not mind. Ruach is wind. Ruach is breath, but it is not mind. Now the same 
connotations are present in the origins of the Greek word, pneuma. I will not 
address this tomorrow so I may say it right away. The word pneuma and the 
history of pneuma is the basis of the field concept of modem physics. This 
has been asserted by Max Jammer, who is the leading authority in the study 
of the key concepts of the natural sciences in the history. He has studied the 
concept of space and Albert Einstein wrote a famous preface to that book on 
the history of the concept of space by Max Jammer. He has also studied the 
concept of mass in physics and also the concept of field, and produced some 
evidence, that the pneuma theory of especially Stoic philosophy was the im-
mediate predecessor of the field theories of modem physics. Therefore, I 
happen to think that the field concept stands closer to the biblical term 
pneuma than the concept "mind" does. It was only the Platonist Origen who 
succeeded to identify definitively mind and spirit. And we should be open 
to revise our understanding a little bit. 
Of course, to say that God is spirit is not all that can be said about God. 
In the first place God is Yahweh, or God is the Father-and the divine Spirit 
is concrete only in the person of the Father or in the way the Spirit is going 
out from the Father. Then of course a Christian peculiarity, again, is that in 
relation to the Son, the Spirit is manifest as a distinct person of its own, 
which we don't find in the Old Testament, but it is part of our Christian 
faith. 
So, my answer to the main point that you made is that the divine reality 
which has the character of a field rather than of an anthropomorphic kind of 
mind, is concrete only in the persons-first of all the Father, the God of the 
Old Testament, but inseparably connected with the Son and the Spirit. 
Peterson: Professor Pannenberg, as one who is interested in the philosophi-
cal problem of evil, I'd like to know your thoughts along those lines for the-
ology. As you undoubtedly know, there are many who believe the problem 
of evil is the central problem for Christian theology. I'm thinking of my 
question particularly in terms of your emphasis that theology should not be 
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detached from history, and I wonder if that emphasis doesn't make it par-
ticularly important for Christian theology to engage actual historical evils, 
such as the horrors of the holocaust. Would you care to comment? 
Pannenberg: Well, that's not the easiest question. You could have held back 
a little bit in the polite American way before challenging me to the bottom of 
my Christian faith in this way! 
I would like to say first that the reality of evil is certainly the most seri-
ous argument against the existence of God in this world. It is not the most 
serious intellectual argument, but it is the most serious argument in terms of 
the evidence of feeling and experience. Intellectually, it is not very conclu-
sive. But on the more basic emotional level, it is the major evidence against 
the existence of God. And so it will continue until the last day. We learn 
from the Bible that this is so. Thus, this issue will be definitively solved, not 
by our theoretical arguments, but only by the action of God Himself in the 
future of His Kingdom. We must, of course, say more than this, because we 
live in this world and, as Christians, we also have to struggle with this issue 
in our present lives. 
Now, if you believe in God, the problem of evil-the reality of evil-
does not put you to shambles. It is not the believer who is afraid of the prob-
lem but it is the unbeliever who thinks he cannot believe because of it. The 
moment you believe, the situation is quite different. If you read the book of 
Job, which is, of course, a book on this theodicy question in the Bible, Job 
never comes to the point of doubting the existence of God, does he? He 
complains about the situation. He charges Yahweh with treating him un-
justly. But he never doubts the existence of God. And in the end of the book 
of Job it is the glory of God's work as the creator in nature which eventually 
makes Job aware that, after all, he is but a finite being left to death and who 
is he to ask questions like that of God? That's the attitude of the believer, 
even in view of his or her own suffering. Thus the situation of the believer is 
quite different when considering the question of theodicy than the situation 
of the non-believer. 
To the non-believer, it may be the main obstacle to embracing faith in 
God. But on the other hand, to believe in God is the way to deal with this 
situation. There is no other way to deal with it. 
You mentioned the Holocaust. Now I don't know whether you know 
Theodore W. Adorno, who was an atheist. (A Jew can never be an atheist, 
really. And if a Jew is an atheist, this is a way of keeping the second com-
mandment!) I've never met a Jew who, deep down in his heart, is an atheist. 
And certainly Adorno was not. But he said after Auschwitz one can no 
longer talk about God. I always felt that you can say that only if you are in a 
position of watching a tragedy in theater. You cannot say that, if you think 
of yourself in the place of those who had to go into the gas ovens, because 
those who had to walk that way had their only hope in singing psalms. You 
perhaps know about that. The only power to deal with experiences like that 
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is not in simply observing them in others, but if one has to go through them 
oneself. Therefore, I don't think it is a very convincing argument really. The 
moment you believe in God you get hold of the only power that enables you 
to face experiences of terror like that. You get deprived of the best ally we 
have in fighting the power of evil when you let go of the faith of God. 
Well, the question remains, how is it reconcilable with the power and 
goodness of God that He created the world such as we experience it? And 
then, in addressing this rather limited question within the broad range of 
the question you posed to me, considerations gain the force that have been 
raised in this history of dealing with the problem of theodicy, and especially 
in its classical Leibnitzian form. Because Leibnitz not only argued that evil 
was admitted because of freedom-of having freedom-but he argues that 
evil is bound up with the very existence of independent, finite reality. If one 
wants to have independent, finite reality, one cannot at the same time avoid 
evil in all its forms. One has to have the patience-and a Creator, if you al-
low me to say so, may have the patience-to deal with His creation, seeing, 
watching it being tempted by evil, without, however, being finally over-
whelmed by it. Augustine once said a very beautiful word about this issue, 
different from Clement of Alexandria whom he otherwise often followed. 
Clement said evil comes from the free will of the creature, so God is not re-
sponsible for the evil in this world. Augustine was too intelligent a man to 
be content with this kind of answer because, after all, God had created that 
creature that is going to bring about evil, moral evil, by the abuse of its free 
will. And so Augustine said that even in creating Adam, God knew very 
well that this Adam would abuse the freedom he had been given. But God 
knew even more than that: He also knew that Jesus Christ would come and 
save Adam from the consequence of death that would result from his sin. 
And I think this is a very beautiful word because it entails, on the one hand, 
God the creator bought the independent existence of creatures at the price of 
admitting evil in His creation. But on the other hand, He also had in view 
what His aim for His creation is: the rescue of the creation by the death and 
resurrection of His Son and by the final eschatological overcoming of evil. 
Anderson: Professor Pannenberg, your criticism of the doctrine of the Vir-
gin Birth is well known. For those who may not be familiar with it, I'll 
briefly summarize. You consider the Virgin Birth to be an atheological leg-
end (based on historical critical concerns, I believe) and you think that the 
doctrine was only later conceived by the early church to support the idea of 
incarnation, unaware of the contradiction inherent in that-that the Virgin 
Birth says that Jesus is God's Son from His beginning and the Incarnation 
refers to His preexistence. You believe that the doctrine of the Virgin Birth 
has been mistakenly accorded the same status as the Resurrection in support 
of the idea of incarnation. Also, interestingly, you level a criticism against 
those who use the doctrine to promote piety, particularly with regard to 
Mary. I think that may have something to do with your criticism of Karl 
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Barth, perhaps-Mariolatry in Protestantism. In spite of these criticisms, you 
wrote in the Apostle's Creed and Jesus-God and Man, that Christians should 
retain the creedal affirmation in the Apostle's Creed-not affirming the his-
toricity of the Virgin Birth but affirming the motivation that went into the 
formulation of the Creed. 
Based on this, I have three related questions. Why would it not be pos-
sible to affirm the historicity of the virginal conception of Jesus based upon 
the historicity of the Resurrection as that event casts light backward upon 
the events of Jesus' life? Second, could we say, without resorting to pietistic 
solutions, that in terms of salvation history, the virginal conception was not 
comprehendible as an historical occurrence until after Pentecost? And third, 
how do you respond to Oscar Culhnann' s criticism that you have not taken 
sufficient notice of the events and their Spirit-directed interpretations by 
later believers? 
Pannenberg: Well, you reported correctly on my position concerning the is-
sue of the Virgin Birth and I think it is, indeed, a historical question-as, of 
course, the question of the Resurrection is. You cannot settle, however, the 
historicity of the Virgin Birth by referring to the historicity of the Resurrec-
tion. These are two different events, and you cannot solve questions of his-
toricity in general by affirming the historicity of just one event. Of course, in 
terms of miracles, the Resurrection of Jesus is by far the more mysterious 
miracle than the Virgin Birth. So some people have asked me why I accept 
the greater miracle and not the lesser one. Well, in the case of the Virgin 
Birth, even current biological ideas need not be challenged, certainly not in 
the same way as in the case of the Resurrection. But my criticism of the his-
toricity of the Virgin Birth is not based on a disbelief in miracles. I think that 
reality as such is miraculous. And I don't agree with David Hume that the 
mere fact that something is unusual-even if it is uniquely unusual-is suf-
ficient reason to reject a claim to historicity. There have to be other reasons. If 
it could be shown that the traditions of the early Christians were late leg-
ends as a whole, I think it would be very difficult to go on with the Christian 
faith. But this is not the case so far-so far, we have to say. We should not 
make infallible judgments, even in this central part of our faith. This is pre-
cisely the point where faith involves a risk. We are not safe as Christians at 
this point. We are not safe. But we may leave it to God to take care of the 
truth of His gospel. We certainly cannot protect the gospel and the truth of 
the gospel. 
That's my criticism of fundamentalism, of those who want to draw a 
fence around the Scriptures in order to defend them from the application of 
critical reflection. This is an indication of too little faith. Too little faith in 
God. If His revelation is true, He will take care of that Himself. Not we. 
Then, of course, I may tum out to be wrong in my historical judgment 
on the story of the Virgin Birth. But given the situation and the arguments as 
they stand, given the nature of the text that we have, I cannot escape a criti-
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cal judgment here. This may tell you that I don't postulate the inerrancy of 
every word in Scripture just on principle. We couldn't do that unless this is 
a kind of works righteousness, I think. We shouldn't do that. We should 
leave it to God. In this case, there are legendary elements in the Scriptures. 
And, of course, it is clear why this is so. Most professional exegetes would 
concur with the conclusion that the message of the angel in Luke is in fact 
an answer to the question of why this man is called Son of God. And the 
answer in the message of the angel is that He is called the Son of God be-
cause he is to be born by the virgin from the Holy Spirit: It is at this point 
where the original version of the legend and belief in the preexistent Son of 
God is not reconcilable. When we ask, "What's the basis of confessing Jesus 
to be the Son of God?" we have a number of different answers in the early 
Christian writings. We have the answer in the very old text, quoted by Paul 
in the opening sentences of the letter to Romans, that Jesus is the Son of God 
on the basis of his Resurrection. We have the answer in the baptism story of 
Jesus where the voice from heaven declared effectively this man to be the 
Son of God with the adoption formula (if it is an adoption formula) of Psalm 
2:7. We have the Virgin Birth story in but two of the New Testament writ-
ings, while the idea of preexistence is much more widespread generally in 
the New Testament. (And preexistence is actually the basis of the trinitarian 
doctrine. I'm going to say something on that tomorrow.) If one realizes this 
situation, one also has to realize one cannot have everything at the same 
time. We can affirm all these different witnesses by understanding how they 
are related to each other in the process of giving reasons for the faith in Je-
sus Christ being the Son of God; but we cannot conceptually merge what 
Luke and Matthew say on the basis of that predication of Jesus as the Son of 
God, with what Romans 1 says on it, or with the idea of preexistence. The 
Church's later doctrine of the Incarnation has been a combination of the Vir-
gin Birth with the idea of preexistence and precisely in this form of combi-
nation the doctrine of incarnation is not completely biblical. 
You will find the new version of my Christological argument in the sec-
ond volume of my systematic theology, where I argue that the notion of the 
incarnation relates not primarily to the birth of Jesus, but to His whole his-
torical existence. In the main texts about 8 (God sent 
His son into the flesh) and Galatians 4 (God sent His son to be born by a 
woman and put under the law) and explicitly in John 1-we don't have this 
idea related primarily to the event of birth. So, I call upon you to be more 
biblical! 
Anderson: Your criticisms are very strong. They are difficult to address. 
Still, in terms of salvation history, we can think of events which occur in his-
tory that are not comprehendible historically, but are still events in history. 
Then, as Cullmann points out in his book Salvation in History, the Holy Spirit 
later on may direct believers into greater understanding of those events. 
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Pannenberg: I didn't answer that part of your question, I admit. Well, what 
do we really comprehend of history? It is different from case to case, but 
usually not very much. And certainly even though we affirm the historicity 
of the Resurrection of Jesus we don't comprehend very much of what actu-
ally happened. We comprehend best that which is reported to be historical 
and isn't. That's what we comprehend best. And so we comprehend com-
paratively better the legendary character of the Virgin Birth than those 
events that really happened in history because reality is not exhausted by 
our understanding. Our understanding is very provisional. 
Now you say, with Cullmann, the real understanding may have come 
afterward-after Pentecost. Well, there are some obvious questions, includ-
ing whether Mary had forgotten about what happened to her until after 
Pentecost. But I'll not be addressing this question now. It is true that in the 
course of our history we usually understand differently later what had oc-
curred to us earlier. And the difference may be more or less incisive. Some-
times the difference can be very incisive so that we understand in a com-
pletely different way what happened to us earlier than we did then. Some-
times the difference is simply that we come to see our earlier experiences in 
a broader horizon. But, in any event, the actuality of the events is already 
presupposed in that process of hermeneutical change of meaning. Thus, one 
cannot argue from later experiences to the historicity of earlier events. That 
is not sound historical argument in any case of historical judgment, and thus 
we have to accept it in the case of biblical information also. 
Wood: I'd like to ask one question. You have particularly criticized your 
teacher, Karl Barth, for trying to establish the truth of faith from the stand-
point of faith and not critical historical reason. And yet you say that the Res-
urrection of Jesus as an event in history is discernible only to believers. Is 
there any difference between you and your teacher? 
Pannenberg: I have to tell you I like that question because most of the time I 
am taken as somebody who has completely forgotten about his teacher or, 
worse, who is so dependent upon that teacher that he has to follow him 
blindly for most of life. That is not my relationship with Karl Barth. I owe 
him a great deal of gratitude in the formation of my own theological 
thought-and continuously so. But I'm not completely identical with Karl 
Barth. 
I was especially impressed by Barth's emphasis on the sovereignty of 
God which was, of course, his Calvinist heritage to a large extent. But I drew 
different conclusions than Karl Barth did. I concluded that if God is sover-
eign as the Almighty Creator of everything, there should be no animal, no 
human being, and certainly not human nature, there should be no stone on 
this earth that could be adequately understood without this God. In other 
words, we don't need some prior decision of faith, we only need to remove 
our prejudices and look on reality as it presents itself. If God exists, that will 
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be enough. Therefore, I follow another theological method than Karl Barth 
followed. If we establish a prejudice of Christian faith and then go on to ra-
tionalize that prejudice, we act in a manner unworthy of the God we be-
lieve. If we really believe in God, we may ask for His truth in the reality of 
the history that we believe is the history of His manifesting Himself. We 
should remove every prejudgment in the judgment of faith. 
This also applies to the Christian Easter tradition. I don't believe be-
cause of the faith of the apostles. I should say belief in God is not solely de-
pendent on our judgment of the factuality of the Easter story. It is a more 
complex matter. But I believe in the Resurrection of Jesus because I am con-
vinced that all of the criticism against the historicity of this tradition does 
not succeed. It is true that the Resurrection has been attested to only by 
those who became believers. Being a Jew, you cannot at the same time af-
firm the Resurrection of Jesus and continue to be an unbeliever. It is an im-
mediate consequence: If Jesus had been raised by the God of Israel, belief is 
the immediate consequence. And that is the reason why we have only be-
lievers attesting to the Resurrection of Jesus. The story is true, and is re-
ported; rather than the story being a product of the individual faith of those 
who reported that story. To get this backward is to pervert the Christian 
message. Because then we could invent other stories. We could invent a 
story that would be more appropriate for our time. We could invent another 
God with female rather than male features, and so on. Thus, faith should be 
considered as a consequence, a result, of God's action and not to be the pre-
condition that we have to embrace first in order to be able to see the content. 

